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There are two sets of conflicts relating to Jammu and 
Kashmir—the conflict in Kashmir and the conflict of 
Kashmir. The conflict of Kashmir is primarily linked 
to the larger Indo-Pak conflict and its actors include 
India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris. In the initial decades 
following the 1947 partition, India’s primary objec-
tive in the conflict of Kashmir was to internationalize 
the issue to its advantage, based on its legal claim over 
the entire Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) region includ-
ing the Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit, and Baltistan 
regions. These four regions, under direct and indirect 
control of Pakistan, are administered through two 
different political entities. The regions of Mirpur and 
Muzaffarabad—called “Azad Kashmir”—have limited 
autonomy, while the Gilgit and Baltistan regions are 
referred as the Northern Areas and fall under the total 
control of Islamabad. 
Withdrawal of Pakistani troops from “Azad 
Kashmir” and the Northern Areas—collectively 
referred to by India as Pakistan occupied Kashmir 
(PoK)—and its reintegration with the rest of J&K 
had been the primary objective of India during the 
initial phase of the conflict. however, this objective 
slowly changed in a shift that became visible during 
and after the 1971 War with Pakistan. A Line of 
Control (LoC) was established after this war, and it 
is widely believed that during negotiations leading to 
the Simla agreement that followed the war, India and 
Pakistan agreed to convert this line into a permanent 
border between the two countries. Ever since, India’s 
primary objective in the conflict of Kashmir has been 
to maintain the status quo and convert the LoC into 
an international border.
The conflict in Kashmir refers to the relations 
between New Delhi and various communities and 
their aspirations in Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh 
regions. Though the high level of violence since the 
1990s has hijacked the issues in J&K, there are other 
serious issues from these three regions. For example, 
people of Ladakh have been demanding a Union Ter-
ritory (UT) status within India, while the people of 
Jammu region have been demanding a separate state, 
again within India. A major section within Kashmir 
Valley demands complete independence from India, 
while another section demands more autonomy 
in terms of federal-provincial relations. Political 
manipulation, bad governance and corruption have 
been major issues for all three regions.
India’s policy towards the conflict in Kashmir has 
been narrowly focused in terms of addressing the 
political issues of Kashmir Valley, winning the Kash-
miris politically and psychologically, and integrat-
ing them emotionally into the Indian mainstream. 
Until recently, the other two regions—Jammu and 
Ladakh—have been totally neglected by New Delhi.
India’s Kashmir Policies and Strategies
What are the major issues in India’s policies and 
strategies vis-à-vis the conflict in Kashmir and the 
conflict of Kashmir? Though India’s policies towards 
both these conflicts have been criticized as ad hoc 
and reactive, in retrospect it appears New Delhi has 
been clear on what it wants regarding both conflicts. 
Externally with Pakistan, New Delhi wants to convert 
the LoC into an international border and make the 
status quo permanent. Internally, it wants to keep the 
demands for independence under control, aiming to 
win the Kashmiris psychologically and emotionally 
by integrating the political elite into the mainstream. 
The strategies that New Delhi has adopted to secure 
these policies may have different guises, but the 
policies on these two broader issues have remained 
constant. These policies and the strategies adopted to 
secure them require a critique before commenting on 
the contemporary situation and making conclusions 
about the road ahead. 
The Prism of Terrorism • Until recently, India 
perceived both the conflict in and conflict of J&K 
mainly through the prism of terrorism. Internally, 
the absence of militant attacks is seen as the presence 
of peace and political stability in Kashmir. Problems 
of governance are seen as an offshoot of militancy; 
hence, the government has believed that once the 
latter is brought under control, there would be 
better governance. Issues such as corruption and bad 
governance are carpeted under militancy. Counterin-
surgency operations have assumed more significance, 
without understanding that militancy has been the 
product of certain political questions and that once 
these political questions are addressed, the mili-
tancy would automatically die down. These political 
5questions raised by the Kashmiris may be real or 
imaginary or both; but it is the duty of the govern-
ment to address them politically.
Externally, cross-border terrorism was perceived 
as the main bilateral issue vis-à-vis Pakistan. India 
has long avoided discussing J&K with Pakistan and 
repeatedly emphasized that until the latter stops 
cross-border terrorism, there could not be any mean-
ingful negotiation. Internationally, while Pakistan 
attempted to highlight the issue of “human rights” 
and “political oppression” in Kashmir by New Delhi, 
India attempted to flag cross-border terrorism as the 
main issue and hurdle in taking any further measures. 
As cross-border terrorism became the highlight 
of India’s approach towards the conflict of Kashmir, 
two issues became prominent in the 1990s and in the 
early years of this decade. Any dialogue on demili-
tarization or troop relocation in J&K became a non-
negotiable issue for New Delhi, as it was linked to 
cross-border terrorism. New Delhi repeatedly empha-
sized that unless cross-border terrorism is stopped, 
there cannot be discussion on troop withdrawal, as 
the latter is a response to the former. 
As part of a unilateral measure to address cross-
border terrorism, New Delhi decided to fence the 
Line of Control. The international border between 
the two countries has already been fenced and 
regularly patrolled by the paramilitary forces on both 
sides. The LoC until the mid-1990s was never fenced. 
Pakistan has always been opposed to the idea of India 
fencing the LoC, as it felt fencing would give an 
element of permanency to the LoC. As a part of not 
allowing the fencing, Pakistan resorted to continuous 
shelling whenever India undertook any efforts on the 
same. With a ceasefire in place since the end of 2003, 
India went ahead and completed fencing the LoC. 
Efforts are in progress to install advanced sensors and 
related equipments to electronically monitor this 
fencing.
India’s Narrow Focus • The “political” approach 
vis-à-vis the conflicts in and of Kashmir that New 
Delhi has pursued has, until recently, always been 
narrowly focused. Within India, successive govern-
ments in New Delhi have carried out a strategy 
based on organizing periodic elections for the state 
legislative assembly of Jammu and Kashmir and 
sustaining an elected government at the state level. 
Elections, whether rigged or free, are seen as an 
“end” in J&K; the party or coalition that forms the 
government subsequently in Srinagar is expected to 
adhere to the existing provisions and maintain the 
status quo, without any demands on changing the 
nature of union-state relations. In the late 1990s, the 
Union government relied completely on the National 
Conference (NC) government led by Farooq Abdul-
lah, and now seems to be continuing the same with 
the Congress-Peoples Democratic Party coalition 
government.
Once the state government is in place in Srinagar, 
the Union government’s approach towards Kashmir 
is limited only to the former, irrespective of its popu-
larity. Until recently, any further political engage-
ments outside this sphere have been ad hoc and were 
without any focus; the Union government failed to 
initiate any substantial dialogue with those sections 
that fall outside the mainstream political parties, 
especially the separatists led by two factions of the 
All Parties hurriyat Conference (APhC) and other 
independent leaders. 
Only recently did the Union government initiate 
efforts to address all of the groups concerned. Two 
Round Table Conferences (RTCs) have been orga-
nized since 2006, and five working groups have been 
formed on different issues, which include the follow-
ing: New Delhi’s relations with the State, increasing 
relations across the Line of Control (LoC), boosting 
the State’s economic development, rehabilitating the 
victims of violence, and ensuring good governance. 
These Working Groups have submitted their reports 
and New Delhi is yet to initiate follow up actions on 
these recommendations.
Vis-à-vis Pakistan, India has long refused to initi-
ate a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir. As mentioned 
above, cross-border terrorism became a major issue in 
the conflict of Kashmir with Pakistan. however, since 
the end of the 1990s, for the first time India had 
agreed to include J&K as a part of various other bilat-
eral negotiations including those over Siachen, Tulbul 
Navigation/Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, elimination 
of terrorism and illicit narcotics, economic and com-
mercial cooperation, and exchange of friendly visits. 
Since 2004, two slogans have become the 
catchwords of India’s approach towards Pakistan 
on Kashmir—“soft borders” and “making borders 
irrelevant.” Atal Behari Vajpayee, the previous Prime 
Minister, took bold measures in addressing the con-
flict of Kashmir. Efforts were made to make borders 
“soft” in terms of breaching it legally through more 
crossing points and a liberalized visa regime. These 
efforts witnessed the introduction of the first bus 
service between the two countries from New Delhi 
to Lahore, and talks being initiated on opening the 
international border in other areas. As a result, today 
there is a new rail link between Sindh in Pakistan and 
Rajasthan in India and another bus service between 
Amritsar and Nankana Sahib across the international 
border. Although both these connections became 
functional under the Congress government, efforts 
were taken under Vajpayee’s administration to make 
borders soft.
Manmohan Singh, the current Prime Minis-
ter, came out with a new slogan—making borders 
irrelevant. This caught people’s imagination especially 
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6after the devastating earthquake in October 2005. 
A few months before the earthquake, a bus service 
was introduced between the two Kashmirs—between 
Muzaffarabad and Srinagar—marking the first time 
such travel was possible in six decades. The opening 
of the LoC in the Jammu region followed this step; 
today there is another bus service between Poonch 
and Rawlakot. 
Resolving the Conflicts: Challenges Ahead
Undoubtedly, in recent years India has taken signifi-
cant measures to address both the conflicts in and 
of Kashmir. Further progress would depend on the 
following. First, in the past and even today, there 
has been no consensus at the national level on what 
could be India’s game plan in Jammu and Kashmir 
and how far it could go in terms of a final resolution. 
The existing Parliamentary Resolution signifies India’s 
maximalist position and not what is feasible and 
practical. The Union government has been reluctant 
to create such a consensus both inside and outside 
the Parliament. There is a clear difference between the 
secular moderates and the extremist hindu Right in 
India. For a final resolution, a national consensus is 
essential inside India. 
The same is also true inside Pakistan. There is no 
consensus inside Pakistan on what could be the final 
settlement of Kashmir. Though Pakistan has been 
insisting on the rhetoric of “what is acceptable to the 
people of Kashmir,” in reality, both the State and its 
people will be unwilling to let go of territory under 
its control. While it would be agreeable to Pakistan 
to continue with the present set up in Muzaffarabad, 
it would be unacceptable to change the status quo, 
especially of the Northern Areas. The recent package 
announced by General Musharraf in October 2007 
on the Northern Areas is cosmetic and a part of 
Islamabad’s larger plan to keep this region under its 
perpetual control. The Northern Areas are strategi-
cally important to Pakistan today for various reasons. 
Among them, the Karakoram highway (KKh) and 
the water resources of the region are significant. With 
Pakistan having plans to expand the KKh and con-
struct a road-rail-gas pipeline link from Gwadar port 
in Balochistan to Kashgar in China, this region is of 
enormous importance.
Second, clearly whether it is making borders 
soft or irrelevant, India’s strategies are aimed at not 
redrawing the existing boundaries, whereas Pakistan’s 
efforts for six decades have been aimed at altering the 
status quo. Much would depend on how successfully 
India can be in convincing Pakistan on this issue.
Third, relating to the conflict in Kashmir, as 
mentioned above, New Delhi has taken significant 
measures. however, two important steps are not 
being addressed convincingly so far. One, the dia-
logue inside India, between New Delhi and various 
groups of Kashmir, even today remains unconvinc-
ing. The separatist groups, led by the two factions 
of the hurriyat Conference, are yet to be taken into 
confidence. For various political reasons, both fac-
tions of the hurriyat Conference have so far refused 
to enter into any meaningful dialogue with New 
Delhi. True, the hurriyat certainly cannot be consid-
ered as the sole voice of the Kashmiris, for its support 
base is narrowly based inside Kashmir Valley and has 
no representation in the Jammu and Ladakh regions. 
however, undoubtedly, it does represent a segment of 
opinion inside Kashmir Valley. 
Besides the separatists, the Union government has 
also not been able to initiate any dialogue with the 
militant groups. Today, the non-State armed groups 
fighting in Kashmir can be clearly divided into two 
groups. The first one, led by the hizbul Mujahideen, 
has ambitions that are more political and limited 
to Kashmir. Cadres of hizbul are primarily Kash-
miris and have been fighting for a political cause. 
The second group is led by the Lashkar-e-Toiba 
and Jaish-e-Mohammad, with both political and 
religious ambitions aimed at a larger cause—beyond 
Kashmir—of destroying India. Cadres of Jaish and 
Lashkar are primarily drawn from Pakistan. The 
Indian security and intelligence forces have been suc-
cessful in forcing the cadres of hizbul to surrender or 
eliminating them considerably, thus weakening their 
base. however, Lashkar and Jaish have been fighting 
a bloody battle against the Indian security forces. 
Besides, the control of Pakistan’s security forces over 
Jaish and Lashkar in recent years has been questioned 
seriously. The important question that needs to be 
addressed here is: what if a compromise acceptable 
to India, Pakistan, and a section of Kashmiris is not 
acceptable to these jihadi forces?
Finally, India has to take proactive and if needed 
even unilateral measures in increasing the cross-
LoC interactions. In September 2007, both India 
and Pakistan agreed in principle to trade across the 
Line of Control. Ever since the LoC opened for the 
bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar in 
2005, people living in all five parts of J&K—Jammu, 
Muzaffarabad, Northern Areas, Kashmir Valley and 
Ladakh—have been demanding the opening of the 
LoC for economic and cultural interactions. While 
the Chambers of Commerce and Industries, both 
in Jammu and Srinagar, have pressured New Delhi 
to open the LoC for trade, people in the these five 
regions have been putting pressure on both govern-
ments to open more routes and allow more people 
to cross the LoC. The apple and carpet industries in 
Kashmir Valley in particular have been demanding 
the opening of the LoC for trade. Today, Kashmiri 
apples go from the valley by truck via Jammu to 
Delhi and then beyond. If the LoC is opened for 
goods, the apples from Anantnag and Sopore could 
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7reach Rawalpindi via Muzaffarabad faster than they 
could reach New Delhi. 
So far the cross-LoC interactions have been nar-
rowly based in addressing the interests of only one 
region—the Kashmir Valley. The regions of Jammu 
and Ladakh have been largely ignored. There are 
numerous divided families in the Kargil region, who 
have relatives across the LoC in Skardu and Gilgit 
and also in the Jammu region. India should take 
active measures to open Kargil-Skardu and Jammu-
Sialkot roads for the movement of divided families. 
There is a need to expand the interactions along the 
LoC and this enlargement should address all five 
regions—Jammu, Muzaffarabad, Kashmir Valley, 
Northern Areas and Ladakh.
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Historically, Pakistan has viewed its dispute with 
India over Kashmir as the key determinant of its stra-
tegic behavior in the international arena. Advocacy of 
the rights of the Kashmiri people to freely determine 
their future has been the main plank of Islamabad’s 
diplomatic strategy in the United Nations and other 
international fora. By championing the cause of the 
rights of the Kashmiri people, Islamabad has tried to 
remind the world that India’s control over two-thirds 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is not only legally 
untenable but morally unjust, as it was achieved 
through an instrument of accession with a ruler who 
had lost the support of the vast majority of his pre-
dominantly Muslim subjects. Pakistan’s official stance 
on Kashmir can be summarized into the following six 
interrelated propositions:
1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed 
territory.
2. This disputed status is acknowledged in the UN 
Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 
and January 5, 1949, to which both Pakistan and 
India are a party.
3. These resolutions remain operative and cannot be 
unilaterally disregarded by either party.
4. Talks between India and Pakistan over the future 
status of Jammu and Kashmir should aim to 
secure the right of self-determination for the 
Kashmiri people. This right entails a free, fair and 
internationally supervised plebiscite as agreed in 
the UN Security Council resolutions.
5. The plebiscite should offer the people of Jammu 
and Kashmir the choice of permanent accession to 
either Pakistan or India.
6. Talks between India and Pakistan, in regard to the 
future status of Jammu and Kashmir, should be 
held in conformity both with the Simla Agree-
ment of July 1972 and the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions. An international mediatory 
role in such talks may be appropriate if mutually 
agreed.
This stated Pakistani position on Kashmir has 
undergone a fundamental shift under President 
General Pervez Musharraf who, after assuming power 
in October 1999 in a bloodless coup, has been, in his 
own words, “pondering outside the box” solutions 
to resolve the dispute. This paper examines various 
aspects of the changing Pakistani outlook on Kashmir 
and analyzes different factors underpinning this 
change. 
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